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REFLECTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE OECD 
IN DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL TAX 
NORMS 
Hugh J. Ault* 
INTRODUCTION 
n September 8–9, 2008, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”) held a Special Conference 
commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the OECD Model Tax Conven-
tion (“Model Convention” or “Model”).1 The Conference was attended 
by over 650 participants from the private sector and the government, 
representing over 100 countries. Both the level of participation2 and the 
geographical diversity represented at the conference would seem con-
crete evidence of the perceived importance of the role of the OECD in 
developing international tax norms. In his remarks opening the confe-
rence, the OECD Secretary General noted that the success of the OECD 
Model was based on three elements: “the capacity to adapt international 
tax rules to the changing business environment, the enhanced participa-
tion of the business community and the progressive involvement of non-
member countries.”3 His observations about the Model Convention are 
more generally applicable to all of the OECD’s work in the tax area. 
In this paper, I would like to focus on the process through which the 
OECD works, as reflected in several of the projects in which the OECD 
could be said to be developing international tax norms. Hopefully, a bet-
ter understanding of how the OECD functions at a practical level will 
help to inform the fascinating theoretical academic scholarship that has 
focused on the OECD tax work.4 
                                                                                                             
 *  Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, and Senior Advisor since 1997, 
Centre for Tax Policy and Analysis, OECD. The views expressed are those of the author 
and should not be interpreted as the positions of the OECD or any of its member govern-
ments. 
 1. See Joann M. Weiner, OECD Celebrates 50th Anniversary of Model Tax Conven-
tion, 51 TAX NOTES INT’L 997 (2008). 
 2. The conference was sold out within a few weeks of its announcement. 
 3. Angel Gurría, OECD Secretary-General, Remarks at Conference on the 50th An-
niversary of the OECD Model Tax Convention (Sept. 8, 2008). 
 4. See, e.g., Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract, 18 MINN. 
J. INT’L L. 99 (2009); Arthur J. Cockfield, The Rise of the OECD as Informal ‘World Tax 
Organization’ Through National Responses to E-commerce Tax Challenges, 8 YALE J.L. 
& TECH.136 (2006); Diane M. Ring, What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: Inter-
national Tax and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155 (2008). 
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I. LEGAL STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE OECD 
The OECD was formed in 1961 as the successor to the Organization 
for European Economic Co-operation, which was set up in 1948 to coor-
dinate Marshall Plan relief.5 It is based on the Convention of December 
14, 1960.6 The OECD Council is the principal decision-making body of 
the organization and is composed of representatives from the thirty 
Member countries, which send Ambassadors to the OECD as well as 
staff national delegations. Decisions must be made on a consensus basis, 
and any country has the right to veto any proposed action at the Council 
level. The substantive work of the OECD is carried out in specialized 
Committees working in various areas: economics, trade, financial mar-
kets, labor, public governance, and the like. There are about 200 Com-
mittees, working groups, and expert groups in all. Some 40,000 senior 
officials from national administrations come to OECD Committee meet-
ings each year to request, review, and contribute to work undertaken by 
the OECD Secretariat. The Committees meet regularly to come to deci-
sions on issues and submit proposals to the Council for approval. 
While the founding Convention provides for “decisions” that are bind-
ing on Member States,7 this form of an OECD Act is not often used. The 
most frequently used form of an OECD Act is the Council Recommenda-
tion. Under the OECD’s procedures, a Recommendation represents the 
strong political commitment of a country to follow the Recommendation 
in its domestic policy. Recommendations are often composed of a gener-
al statement of principle with an Annex setting out more detailed rules 
and entitled “Guidelines.” The OECD also issues Reports, which are not 
legal instruments but written analyses of particular issues. They can be 
adopted at the Committee level as well as at the Council level.8 Before 
final action is taken by the OECD in the area of taxation, the work is of-
                                                                                                             
 5. OECD, History, http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761863_1_1 
_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
 6. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
Dec. 14, 1969, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 888 U.N.T.S. 179 [hereinafter OECD Convention]. Inte-
restingly, it was viewed as the economic counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation. 
 7. Id. The Code on the Liberalization of Capital Movements is an example. 
 8. For example, the report “The Application of the OECD Model Tax Convention to 
Partnerships” was first presented as a report with suggested changes to Commentary and 
then changes in the Commentary were implemented in a Recommendation as part of the 
2000 Model update. See OECD, 2 Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital 
R(15-1) (Apr. 2000) (current version available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/57/42219 
418.pdf). 
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ten published for public comment as a Discussion Draft.9 The OECD 
also publishes statistical analyses and other descriptive information in the 
various fields in which it operates. The Economics Directorate publishes 
Economic Surveys of both Member and non-Member countries, often 
with quite prescriptive policy analyses in many areas, including tax. 
Funding for the OECD is provided by the Member States. A portion of 
the budget is funded by contributions based on relative GDP and another 
portion based on individual country contributions. In 2008, the United 
States provided nearly 25% of the budget of EUR 303 million, and Japan 
contributed 14%. Iceland contributed 0.1%.10 
The original membership of the OECD has expanded over the years, 
most recently with the admission of Mexico (1994), the Czech Republic 
(1995), Hungary (1996), Korea (1996), Poland (1996), and the Slovak 
Republic (2000).11 Thus, while the OECD is often characterized as the 
“rich man’s club,” in fact the Member country economies vary substan-
tially.12 Currently, an accessions process leading to membership is under 
way with Chile, Estonia, Israel, Russia, and Slovenia. Discussions are 
also underway with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa on 
enhanced engagement programs with a view to possible membership.13 
In addition, a number of countries have Observer status on various 
Committees. For example, Argentina, Chile, China, Russia, India, and 
South Africa are Observers on the Committee on Fiscal Affairs.14 
The activities of the Committees are supported by the Secretariat and 
led by the Secretary General, who also chairs Council meetings, thus 
providing a link between the staff input and the Member countries. The 
                                                                                                             
 9. See OECD, OECD Aims to Improve International Tax Disputes Mechanisms 
(Mar. 13, 2006), http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3343,en_2649_37989739_3627100 
4_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 10. OECD, Scale of Members’ Contributions to the OECD’s Core Budget-2009, 
http://www.oecd.org/document/14/0,3343,en_2649_201185_31420750_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2009). 
 11. OECD, Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/ 
58/0,3343,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
 12. For example, both Mexico and Korea have basic tax policies that reflect strong 
interests as source countries. 
 13. OECD, OECD Member Countries, http://www.oecd.org/countrieslist/0,3351,en_ 
33873108_33844430_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
 14. OECD, China, South Africa to Participate in Work of OECD’s Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs (June 6, 2004), http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3343,en_2649_34897 
_32074069_1_1_1_1,00.html; OECD, OECD Countries Welcome Chile’s Participation 
in the OECD’s Taxation Work, http://www.oecd.org/document/33/0,3343,en_2649_348 
97_36339297_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2009); OECD, OECD Invites India 
to Participate in Its Committee on Fiscal Affairs, http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0, 
3343,en_2649_34897_37131209_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
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Secretariat is organized around Directorates, which provide support for 
the various Committees. The current professional staff is about 700. 
Some of the staff are international civil servants associated with the 
OECD on a long-term basis, and others are secondees from national ad-
ministrations, typically spending several years at the OECD. 
II. ORGANIZATION OF TAX ANALYSIS AT THE OECD 
Most work in the tax area is done by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs 
(“CFA”). The Committee meets twice a year in Paris. Country represent-
atives are generally high-level officials in national treasuries and tax ad-
ministrations. The United States typically sends the International Tax 
Counsel and the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax. Other 
Treasury and Internal Revenue Service officials may attend depending 
on the items on the agenda. The Chair of the CFA is currently from Ita-
ly;15 recent past chairs have been from Sweden, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada. Currently, in addition to representatives of 
the thirty Member countries, Observers are sent from Argentina, Chile, 
China, India, Russia, and South Africa. 
According to the CFA’s Mission Statement, its goals are 
to provide a forum for tax policymakers and administrators to discuss 
current policy and administration issues; to assist OECD countries and 
non-OECD [countries]16 to improve the design and operation of their 
tax systems; to promote co-operation and co-ordination among them in 
the area of taxation; and to encourage non-OECD economies to adopt 
taxation practices which promote economic growth through the devel-
opment of international trade and investment.17 
Much of the preparatory work for the CFA meetings is done by the 
CFA Bureau, an executive Committee that meets periodically between 
the CFA plenary meetings. The Bureau develops the agenda for the CFA 
meeting and often prepares Recommendations for particular issues, 
which have a great deal of presumptive weight in the discussions. Often, 
at impasses in the CFA meeting discussions, the Bureau will meet sepa-
rately and prepare compromise solutions. The CFA approves the Pro-
                                                                                                             
 15. OECD, New Chair of the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs, http://www.oecd. 
org/document/20/0,2340,en_2649_34897_36396500_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 
20, 2009). 
 16. OECD documents typically refer to “Non-Member Economies” rather than Non-
Member Countries because of the participation of some dependent territories that have 
fiscal autonomy (e.g., Hong Kong) or to avoid political issues (e.g., Taiwan). Here, I will 
use the less awkward Non-OECD Member. 
 17. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD’S CURRENT TAX AGENDA (2008), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/17/1909369.pdf. 
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gram of Work and gives mandates to various subsidiary bodies to carry 
out the work. Topics for the work usually come from the subsidiary bo-
dies themselves, based on proposals by Member countries, businesses, or 
the Secretariat, and the proposals are subsequently approved by the CFA. 
The most important subsidiary bodies are structured as follows: Work-
ing Party 1 deals with tax treaty and related issues; Working Party 2 cov-
ers tax policy analysis and statistical work; Working Party 6 deals with 
the taxation of multinational enterprises, including transfer pricing; 
Working Party 8 investigates how Member governments can cooperate 
to minimize the extent of tax evasion and avoidance; Working Party 9 
examines consumption taxes.18 In addition to the Working Parties, the 
Forum on Harmful Tax Practices advances the OECD’s work on harmful 
tax practices, and the Forum on Tax Administration provides a forum to 
improve taxpayer service and compliance. 
The CFA also sponsors a number of events aimed at pursuing a dialo-
gue and sharing expertise with non-Member countries at its Multilateral 
Tax Centres in Austria, Hungary, Korea, Mexico, and Turkey and at its 
in-country Centres in Moscow and Yangzhou, China.19 Individual events 
are also provided. For example, four events are held each year in India at 
the Indian National Academy of Direct Taxes in Nagpur. These meetings 
cover a broad range of topics including tax treaty policy and negotiation, 
transfer pricing, tax policy including modeling and the use of incentives, 
auditing, and value added tax compliance. Over sixty events, each typi-
cally lasting one week, are staged each year. 
Another important mechanism through which the OECD carries on its 
dialogue with Non-OECD Members in the tax area is the Global Forum 
on Taxation, which are large international meetings held to cover a varie-
ty of subjects. The composition of the Global Forum generally varies 
depending on the topics covered. The annual Global Forum Meeting on 
Tax Treaties, which has the broadest country participation, typically at-
tracts several hundred participants from over ninety countries. 
The CFA’s work is supported by the Centre for Tax Policy and Ad-
ministration, a Directorate within the Secretariat. The Centre is divided 
into Divisions that serve the various working parties and other subsidiary 
bodies. Some of the staff of the Centre are on long-term or indefinite 
contracts, and others are seconded to the Centre for more limited periods 
                                                                                                             
 18. The odd numbering arrangement comes from the fact that when Working Parties 
achieve their mandate, they go out of existence but the continuing Working Parties are 
not renumbered. 
 19. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CTR. FOR CO-OPERATION WITH NON-
MEMBERS, THE OECD’S GLOBAL RELATIONS PROGRAMME (2007–08), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/5/39109041.pdf. 
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of time by the Member countries. The Centre staff play a key role in the 
CFA’s work and represent the organization, not any particular country. 
While procedures vary from topic to topic, typically the responsible Di-
vision prepares the initial drafts of the documents on the matter in ques-
tion. The drafts are first discussed in smaller working groups or directly 
at the Working Party or Forum level and then discussed on a line-by-line 
basis by the delegates. Proposed changes and redrafted text are put for-
ward by the delegates. The Chair of the meeting usually summarizes the 
results of the discussion. The text is then redrafted by the staff and re-
viewed by the delegates for final approval. In some cases, additional 
changes are made in the final drafting by the Secretariat and are ap-
proved by written communication. Thus, the skill of the staff in dealing 
with delegates in reaching (and in some cases possibly creating) a con-
sensus on the substantive issues is extremely important. Depending on 
the complexity and political sensitivity of the issues involved, the draft-
ing process can take a few weeks or more than a decade (e.g., as has been 
the case for the recently approved Report on Attribution of Profits to 
Permanent Establishments). 
Private sector input into the CFA’s work comes from several sources. 
The Business and Industry Advisory Committee (“BIAC”) and, to a less-
er extent, the Trade Union Advisory Committee (“TUAC”) comment on 
documents both while they are being prepared and after they have been 
issued. In addition, it is common to issue a Discussion Draft for public 
comment and, in some cases, to hold a Consultative meeting attended by 
both government and private sector representatives to review the Discus-
sion Draft.20 Dialogue with the private sector at the inception of a project 
may take the form of a Centre for Tax Policy and Administration Round-
table, such as those held in recent years on business restructuring and the 
tax treaty treatment of collective investment vehicles. There are also a 
variety of ways in which dialogue can be conducted throughout the 
course of a project, either by having private sector representatives partic-
ipate in the drafting groups, which was done with the e-commerce work 
in the 1990s and the current projects on collective investment vehicles 
and real estate investment trusts, or by having them act as advisory 
groups to the governmental delegates, which was done with the revisions 
to the OECD Model Commentary on international transportation income. 
Some general observations can be made about the process through 
which the CFA deals with tax matters. In the first place, the consensus 
principle is extremely important and taken very seriously by the partici-
pants. The lengthy discussions, skillfully led by the Chair and the Secre-
                                                                                                             
 20. OECD Aims to Improve International Tax Disputes Mechanisms, supra note 9. 
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tariat, can often lead to agreements and compromises that were not at all 
evident when the discussions began. In addition, the process is an itera-
tive one, with the same parties, both in terms of countries and in terms of 
persons, often having a wide range of issues to consider over a number of 
years. Countries are reluctant to be too intransigent on a particular issue, 
as they may need the support of other Members on a subsequent question 
where they have more at stake. Peer pressure and the perceived status of 
various individuals, especially those with a long history at the institution, 
also play a role. 
Sometimes the pressure for consensus can lead to difficulties if the 
pressure to agree on language generates too much ambiguity and leads to 
differences in subsequent interpretation and implementation. There is a 
danger that striving for consensus can result in agreement on “principles” 
at such a high level of generality that they do not in fact advance matters. 
While creative ambiguity can at times be useful, masking important dif-
ferences with bland platitudes is not helpful. As a delegate once ob-
served, if country A says the world is flat and country B says the world is 
round, and after a long discussion, the OECD issues a report that says the 
world is an attractive shape and declares a consensus has been reached, it 
is difficult to call that real progress in establishing international norms. 
On the other hand, “parking” a contentious question in ambiguous lan-
guage while reaching agreement on other related issues can leave open 
the possibility of revisiting that issue for “clarification” at another time. 
These aspects of the OECD process are discussed below in the context 
of more concrete developments in the tax area. 
III. THE PROCESS AT WORK: SOME SELECTED TAX “NORMS” AND THE 
OECD INVOLVEMENT 
A. Harmful Tax Competition21 
It is commonplace that increased globalization of trade and investment 
has made countries’ economies and policies more interconnected. In the 
tax area, that has meant that policies that have been historically devel-
oped in a closed economy now have increasingly important impacts on 
other countries, as economies have become more open. This has led to 
concerns about “harmful tax competition,” where one country’s tax sys-
tem can have a potentially negative impact on those of other countries. In 
                                                                                                             
 21. Reuven Avi-Yonah’s Article looks at the harmful tax competition project after ten 
years; my focus here is to look back at the process through which the project developed. 
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report: A Retrospective 
After a Decade, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 783 (2009). 
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particular, this increased openness has resulted in the appearance of spe-
cial tax regimes and practices aimed at attracting mobile activities and 
capital from other jurisdictions through legislative and administrative tax 
breaks tailored to attract foreign investment. These problems attracted a 
great deal of concern among Member States and in 1996, after much in-
ternal discussion, the OECD Ministers charged the organization to “de-
velop measures to counter the distorting effects of harmful tax competi-
tion on investment and financing decisions and the consequences for na-
tional tax bases, and report back in 1998.”22 The OECD proposal was 
supported by the G7 at their Summit in Lyon in 1996, where they urged 
the OECD to “vigorously pursue its work in [tax competition] aimed at 
establishing a multilateral approach under which countries could operate 
individually and collectively to limit the extent of these practices.”23 
The work was initially carried out in a so-called “Special Session,” an 
ad hoc organizational form that cuts across divisional lines to deal with a 
particular problem. The Special Session fulfilled its mandate by the 1998 
deadline provided by the Ministers and issued the report “Harmful Tax 
Competition: An Emerging Global Issue” (“Report” or “1998 Report”). 
The first issue to be considered in the Special Session was the devel-
opment of a framework for determining when and in what circumstances 
tax competition can be appropriately characterized as “harmful.”24 This 
issue has been the subject of a long and ongoing debate in the economic 
literature about the benefits and detriments of tax competition. Some see 
tax competition as a good and healthy thing—it keeps the Hobbesian Le-
viathan in check, limits the State’s tendency to expand, promotes more 
efficient government and governmental services, and limits political 
pandering to domestic interest groups, purposes that are all very much 
public choice and Buchannan oriented. 
On the other side, there are those who see tax competition as resulting 
in a destructive “race to the bottom.” Tax competition has a number of 
potential negative effects: it causes “bidding wars” in the competition for 
mobile activities, ultimately resulting in no tax at all on mobile capital; it 
makes redistributive, benefits-based income taxation impossible; it may 
require States to shift to other revenue sources, taxing less mobile activi-
ties and taxing labor, in particular, more heavily; it may force a reduction 
                                                                                                             
 22. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION, AN 
EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE 3 (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/0/190 
4176.pdf [hereinafter HTC REPORT]. 
 23. Id. at 7. 
 24. The HTC Report made a distinction between harmful tax competition in the form 
of harmful preferential regimes, which are discussed here, and the issue of tax havens, 
which are discussed infra at note 35. See HTC REPORT, supra note 22, at 19–21. 
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in public expenditures to a suboptimal level; it may prevent the imple-
mentation of democratically arrived at tax policy decisions as to tax mix 
and tax level, and generally leave everyone worse off.25 
There was substantial attention paid to theoretical work in the Special 
Session discussions. There was wide agreement that the general interna-
tional movement in the direction of a broader tax base with fewer prefe-
rences and lower rates, which was in part a result of the “competitive” 
reaction to changes in the U.S. and U.K. systems in the mid-1980s, was a 
good thing.26 It forced the elimination of wasteful and inefficient tax pre-
ferences and excessively high marginal rates, and it generally increased 
efficiency. This approach is consistent with the basic market orientation 
of the OECD. 
It is also clear, though, that some kinds of tax practices can have more 
negative effects than positive ones, and the issues facing the Special Ses-
sion were how to identify those situations and how to develop some kind 
of consensus on a distinction between “fair” and “harmful” tax competi-
tion.27 
As one could imagine, reaching international agreement on a definition 
of harmful tax competition was a difficult and contentious process. Some 
countries—as would be expected of typically high-tax countries—started 
out from the tentative position that any country that had a low rate of tax 
and could potentially attract investment through that rate was engaging in 
harmful tax competition. And in some senses that was true, viewed sole-
ly from the national perspective of the high-tax country, since the other 
                                                                                                             
 25. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of 
the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2000). 
 26. See generally HTC REPORT, supra note 22. 
 27. Much of the economic literature on tax competition is in the subnational area and 
is generally positive about tax competition. The argument goes something like this: local 
taxes tend to be benefits-based taxes, and there is substantial mobility of both individuals 
and business activities. Thus, competition will result in different tax/benefit mixes, which 
actors will respond to by moving, and the results will force local governments to be more 
efficient in the provision of public services, and people will sort themselves out according 
to preference. See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 
64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). This is the so-called efficient Tiebout equilibrium. Obvious-
ly, things in the international setting are different. In the first place, mobility is different, 
though it might be similar with respect to mobile service activities. More important, from 
a theoretical point of view, national-level taxes have a redistributional function beyond 
being simply benefits based. This is the classic Musgrave model in which local units 
provide services and the National government provides nonspatially limited public goods 
and transfer payments. It is not clear how much the subnational analysis, to the extent the 
OECD comes to the conclusion that tax competition is uniformly good, is relevant in the 
international context. 
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jurisdictions with low rates were capable of attracting investment away 
from the high-tax country. 
On the other hand, the issues of what general rate of income tax to im-
pose, or whether or not a State should even have an income tax at all, are 
basic questions of national policy and sovereignty, which every country, 
at least historically, has been able to decide for itself. So, while a low 
rate of tax may be potentially harmful, this cannot be enough—at least at 
this stage of international cooperation—to constitute harmful tax compe-
tition. 
The Report issued by the Special Session distinguishes between a gen-
eral low rate, which applies to all taxpayers and activities in a jurisdiction, 
and a special regime or practice, which is limited to mobile activities.28 
The special regime is combined with some other features that make it 
likely that the effect and, in all probability, the purpose of the regime 
were simply to attract investment from elsewhere with no other impact 
on the domestic economy. The first situation is not covered by the Re-
port, and the second constitutes harmful tax competition.29 So to take two 
extreme examples, if a country introduces a general, nondiscriminatory, 
across-the-board 12.5% corporate tax rate, this would be viewed as an 
appropriate policy choice under the approach adopted by the OECD. In 
contrast, it would constitute harmful tax competition if the country has a 
special zero-tax regime for corporations engaged in offshore banking 
where (1) only foreign investors can invest; (2) those corporations cannot 
do business in the domestic economy; and (3) the country will not ex-
change information about the income of such corporations with the in-
vestors’ home country (so that the latter country could try to continue to 
tax its residents on the income arising in the regime). For cases in be-
tween these extremes, the Report emphasizes that the decision is to be 
made on the basis of all the factors taken together in context.30 
The articulation of these principles was an important first step in creat-
ing a framework that can preserve the benefits of “fair” competition 
while restraining the negative effects of other forms. However, the actual 
implementation of these ideas requires some sort of international institu-
tional framework through which the principles can be developed and 
monitored. Countries dealing with issues of tax competition are, to use a 
game theory concept, in a prisoner’s dilemma situation. If all cooperated, 
all would be better off than if no one cooperated, but if some cooperated 
                                                                                                             
 28. HTC REPORT, supra note 22, at 20–21. 
 29. One could see this as recognition of some sort of “sovereign duty” not to utilize a 
tax practice that has the sole purpose of negatively impacting another jurisdiction. Cf. 
Christians, supra note 4. 
 30. HTC REPORT, supra note 22, at 21. 
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and others did not, the defectors who did not play by the rules could ac-
tually be the winners. What was needed was an institutional framework 
both to develop the principles and to establish a monitoring mechanism 
that, if necessary, would sanction those countries that were tempted to 
stray. The beginning of such a structure was developed in the OECD 
work through the establishment of the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices 
and the Global Forum on Taxation. 
The Report established a new subsidiary body within the OECD, the 
Forum on Harmful Tax Practices, which, since 1998, has administered a 
set of guidelines on tax practices setting out certain obligations on coun-
tries that adopted the Report. Under these guidelines, which the Report 
implemented, the countries agreed to carry out a self-review process of 
their domestic measures in light of the criteria set out in the Report and 
to eliminate within a stipulated period of time those measures found to 
constitute harmful tax competition, as defined by the Report. In addition, 
they agreed not to introduce any new measures that would constitute 
harmful tax competition. The self-review process presented the countries 
with a classic prisoner’s dilemma. Each country was looking over its 
shoulder to try to decide whether to cooperate or not. All of them recog-
nized that they would be better off if they cooperated, but they would be 
worse off if they listed their regimes as harmful while other countries did 
not. Conversely, they could be better off if they did not list themselves as 
harmful while others did. 
However, there is another mechanism that strengthens discipline: a 
peer review process that begins after the initial self-review period. Under 
this procedure, a country can ask the Forum to review a measure of 
another country not listed in the self-review, and the Forum can give an 
opinion as to whether or not the regime constitutes harmful tax competi-
tion. If a measure is found to be harmful under the criteria of the Report, 
the offending Member State is obligated under the Report to remove it. 
What does this mean in practice? This question involves the legal na-
ture of the measures contained in the Report. As a formal matter, the Re-
port deals with “Recommendations,” a defined term of art in the OECD 
treaty; as indicated above, these are not binding international law com-
mitments. Under the Treaty, countries undertake to make a strong politi-
cal commitment to follow the Recommendations, but the Treaty express-
ly recognizes that there may be circumstances in which a country is una-
ble to fulfill its commitment or needs to delay compliance. This “soft” 
international undertaking is not legally binding but creates substantial 
peer pressure to act in accordance with the Recommendation. This 
process has been extremely effective in bringing countries to eliminate 
regimes found to be harmful under the criteria of the Report. Of the for-
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ty-seven preferential tax regimes that had been identified as potentially 
harmful in 2000, none of the regimes are deemed harmful at the present 
time.31 A number of regimes have been abolished, others have been 
amended to remove their potentially harmful features, and still others 
were found not to be harmful on further analysis of their actual impact. 
Here, the actual details of the results are less important than the process 
by which they were reached. Countries were able to establish a coopera-
tive process through which they could escape the logic of the prisoner’s 
dilemma. In addition to the consultative process foreseen in the Report, 
the Report also provided for so-called “co-ordinated defensive measures” 
against harmful tax practices. These are, in general terms, measures that 
can counteract the effects of the harmful tax competition in various ways. 
For example, if the residence country can directly tax the income that 
arises in the offshore regime, this can have the effect of discouraging its 
taxpayers from taking advantage of that regime in the first place. Any 
country can unilaterally introduce such measures, but they are more ef-
fective if done on a coordinated basis, the course recommended by the 
Report. Similarly, in some cases, harmful tax competition is the result of 
the utilization of favorable provisions in a tax treaty. A Recommendation 
urges countries to modify treaties to exclude from treaty benefits the in-
come and entities benefiting from measures found to constitute harmful 
tax competition. Given the requirement of action by consensus, the like-
lihood that the OECD would ever actually approve of a defensive meas-
ure against a Member country is doubtful, but in any event the issue has 
not been tested because all regimes previously identified as harmful have 
been eliminated. 
The Recommendation on harmful tax competition was approved by the 
Council with the abstentions of Switzerland and Luxembourg. In annexes 
to the Recommendation, these countries objected to two basic aspects of 
the Report: (1) its focus was only on geographically mobile activities and 
did not include “bricks and mortar” investments, and (2) its stress on the 
importance of the elimination of bank secrecy.32 From a process point of 
view, however, the interesting thing is that neither country elected to ve-
to the project as it could have done under the OECD operating rules. This 
                                                                                                             
 31. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., REPORT TO THE 2000 MINISTERIAL 
COUNCIL MEETING AND RECOMMENDATIONS BY THE COMMITTEE ON FISCAL AFFAIRS, 
TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/data 
oecd/9/61/2090192.pdf; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CTR. FOR TAX POL’Y & 
ADMIN., THE OECD’S PROJECT ON HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES: 2006 UPDATE ON PROGRESS 
IN MEMBER COUNTRIES, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/1/17/37446434.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 
2009). 
 32. HTC REPORT, supra note 22, at 73. 
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would seem to indicate a judgment that the impact of a veto on this im-
portant and high-visibility project would have had a significant negative 
impact on these countries’ abilities to work in the future with the organi-
zation. In addition, both countries in fact participated in the Forum on 
Harmful Tax Practices, submitted their potentially harmful regimes for 
review and, in the case of Switzerland, ultimately made the changes ne-
cessary to have their regime taken off the list of harmful tax regimes.33 
A second aspect of the harmful tax competition project involved the 
treatment of tax havens. This work has been described elsewhere (with 
varying degrees of accuracy),34 and I would like to focus primarily on 
some aspects of how the work evolved. The 1998 Report made a distinc-
tion between countries that collected “significant revenues” from income 
tax and those that did not. With respect to the first category, a “harmful 
preferential regime” was present if the regime involved no or low tax and 
either “ring-fencing,” (that is, limiting the tax to foreign investors), lack 
of transparency, or lack of exchange of information. Tax havens, on the 
other hand, which by definition did not have significant revenues, also 
involved no or nominal tax rates, and lack of transparency and exchange 
of information, in addition to the lack of any requirement of “substantial 
activity” (that is, it was possible to set up a “letter box” or “booking cen-
tre” in the jurisdiction). This requirement was parallel to the “ring-
fencing” requirement for other jurisdictions, as it stipulated that there be 
some real connection between the low-taxed activity and the jurisdiction. 
Applying these criteria, the OECD, in 2002, listed thirty-five jurisdic-
tions that met the technical tax haven criteria and began discussions with 
those jurisdictions focused on getting from them “commitments” to elim-
inate the “harmful features” from their tax systems.35 At the same time, 
the Council instructed the Forum to prepare a list of “uncooperative tax 
havens,” those havens that did not agree to make the necessary commit-
ments. While the OECD process was taking place, there was a change of 
Administration in the United States, and after six months, during which 
time he apparently thought about what reaction to take, Paul O’Neill, 
incoming U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, made the following announce-
ment: 
                                                                                                             
 33. The situation involving the Luxembourg 1929 Holding Company regime is more 
complicated and involves the application of the EU state aid disciplines. 
 34. See generally J.C. SHARMAN, HAVENS IN A STORM: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL 
TAX REGULATION (2006); Lorraine Eden & Robert T. Kudrle, Tax Havens: Renegade 
States in the International Tax Regime?, 27 LAW & POL’Y 100 (2005). 
 35. OECD, The OECD List of Unco-operative Tax Havens—A Statement by the Chair 
of the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs, Gabriel Makhlouf (Apr. 18, 2002), 
http://www.oecd.org/document/28/0,3343,en_2649_33745_2082460_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
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Although the OECD has accomplished many great things over the 
years, I share many of the serious concerns that have been expressed 
recently about the direction of the OECD initiative. I am troubled by 
the underlying premise that low tax rates are somehow suspect and by 
the notion that any country, or group of countries, should interfere in 
any other country’s decision about how to structure its own tax system. 
I also am concerned about the potentially unfair treatment of some non-
OECD countries. The United States does not support efforts to dictate 
to any country what its own tax rates or tax system should be, and will 
not participate in any initiative to harmonize world tax systems. The 
United States simply has no interest in stifling the competition that 
forces governments—like businesses—to create efficiencies. . . . In its 
current form, the project is too broad and it is not in line with this Ad-
ministration’s tax and economic priorities.36 
The O’Neill announcement, despite its substantial mischaracterization 
of the thrust behind the OECD project, appeared on its face to be a dra-
matic withdrawal of support by the United States, previously a key play-
er in the tax competition work.37 In fact, it had much less impact on the 
progress of the project than was initially anticipated. In 2001, the OECD 
revised its criteria for tax haven status by eliminating the “no substantial 
activities” requirement, which had been of very little significance in 
practice.38 In addition, it agreed not to apply defensive measures to tax 
havens any sooner than it applied them to Member country regimes. This 
was largely meaningless because, by this time, it was clear that the 
Member countries themselves would have eliminated the harmful fea-
tures of the regimes. In 2002, the OECD published its list of seven “un-
cooperative tax havens,” which has subsequently been reduced to three.39 
The harmful tax competition exercise raises some interesting process 
points. While the OECD did have an extensive dialogue with the havens 
in connection with the commitment process, the process still had a con-
frontational tone. In its later forms, the tone is more conciliatory. The 
former havens that have made commitments to transparency and ex-
change of information are now called “Participating Partners”; they are 
working together with Member countries in the context of an OECD 
                                                                                                             
 36. Press Release, Paul O’Neill, Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, PO-366 
(May 10, 2001) [hereinafter O’Neill Press Release]. 
 37. The U.S. International Tax Counsel was the first Co-Chairman of the Forum on 
Harmful Tax Practices. 
 38. OECD, The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress Re-
port 9, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/28/2664438.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
 39. These are Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco. See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy 
and Administration, List of Unco-operative Tax Havens, http://www.oecd.org/document/ 
57/0,3343,en_2649_33745_30578809_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
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Global Forum on Taxation to develop uniformity in rules on transparen-
cy and exchange of information.40 Cooperative efforts have also generat-
ed a Model Exchange of Information Agreement,41 which has been suc-
cessfully used in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. However, one 
can wonder how much of the later cooperation would have developed if 
the initial phases of the project had not been as prescriptive as they were. 
In addition, while a number of exchange agreements have been con-
cluded,42 there is an increasing concern about “foot dragging” on the part 
of some jurisdictions that have made commitments and avoided the ini-
tial listing process, but have taken no real steps toward implementation 
since then. Consideration may then turn again to defensive measures, for 
example, perhaps a list of “Committed but Uncooperative Jurisdictions” 
suggesting that “establishing international norms” in some cases must 
involve the combination of cooperation and enforcement mechanisms. 
It is also interesting to note that the focus of much of the later work in 
this area is on exchange of information generally, not just exchange in 
connection with the narrowly defined activities of geographically mobile 
financial services covered by the 1998 Report. For example, the Ex-
change of Information Agreements that have been entered into with the 
havens are not limited to information concerning geographically mobile 
services but cover exchange generally. In addition, they are not limited to 
exchange in criminal conduct, but cover civil exchange as well.43 Thus, 
somewhat ironically, from one perspective, the U.S. “withdrawal” from 
the project had no impact at all on the elimination of ring-fenced regimes 
in Member countries. Actions by countries that eliminated ring-fenced 
regimes in response to the OECD Recommendations involved the recog-
nition by those countries of a substantive international obligation not to 
construct regimes aimed entirely at the tax base of other countries, a 
clear example of the OECD’s “interfering with [an]other country’s deci-
sion about how to structure its own tax system,” which O’Neill found so 
objectionable.44 At the same time, the increased attention that the U.S. 
                                                                                                             
 40. OECD GLOBAL FORUM ON TAXATION: A PROCESS FOR ACHIEVING A GLOBAL LE-
VEL PLAYING FIELD 1 (June 3–4, 2004), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/0/31967501.pdf. 
 41. OECD, Agreement on Exchange of Information on Tax Matters, http://www.oecd. 
org/dataoecd/15/43/2082215.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
 42. For a list of the exchange agreements, see OECD, Model Agreement on Exchange 
of Information on Tax Matters, Developed by the OECD Global Forum Working Group 
on Effective Exchange of Information, http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_ 
33767_38312839_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). 
 43. See, e.g., Agreement on Assistance in Civil and Criminal Tax Matters Through 
Exchange of Information, F.R.G.-Isle of Man, Mar. 2, 2009, available at http:www.oecd. 
org/dataoecd/57/5/42262036.pdf. 
 44. See O’Neill Press Release, supra note 36. 
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position brought to the importance of exchange of information seemingly 
aided in establishing an international norm or benchmark for exchange, 
which includes civil tax matters and goes far beyond O’Neill’s references 
to “tax evaders” and “prosecution of illegal activity.” 
While non-Member countries were not directly involved in developing 
the analytical framework of the 1998 Report before it was adopted, sub-
stantial effort was made to bring non-Member countries into the dialo-
gue. In many cases, their concerns with harmful tax competition were 
greater than those of Member countries because they were less able to 
protect their tax bases unilaterally. Three regional seminars were held in 
Mexico, Singapore, and Turkey while the Report was being drafted.45 At 
this time, the issues raised by harmful tax competition were discussed 
and the views of non-Member countries were expressed. After the Report 
was published and the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices set up, a number 
of multilateral meetings were held in conjunction with the Southern Afri-
can Development Community, the Asian Development Bank, and the 
Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations. After the issuance of 
“Towards Global Tax Co-operation: Progress in Identifying and Elimi-
nating Harmful Tax Practices” (“2000 Report”), which listed preferential 
regimes in Member countries and provided the initial list of tax havens, 
an international symposium to discuss the global implications of harmful 
tax practices was held in Paris and attended by twenty-seven non-
Member countries.46 The purpose of these meetings was to encourage 
non-Member countries to associate themselves with the 1998 Report. 
The Global Forum on Taxation has also held events dealing with harmful 
tax practices and the need for a “level playing field” with regard to trans-
parency and exchange of information. These efforts can be seen as part 
of the wider move by the OECD to be more inclusive. 
B. Dispute Resolution and Arbitration 
As international trade and investment increase, so too do the possibili-
ties of disagreements among countries as to the appropriate application 
of international tax rules. These disputes may involve transfer pricing 
issues, differing characterization rules for income, disagreement about 
whether a permanent establishment exists, or more generally, the appro-
priate exercise of potential taxing rights by the source-country jurisdic-
tion. 
                                                                                                             
 45. The OECD’s Global Relations Programme, supra note 19. 
 46. The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: The 2001 Progress Report, su-
pra note 38, at 7. 
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The OECD Model Convention and bilateral treaties based on the Mod-
el provide a procedural mechanism, the Mutual Agreement Procedure 
(“MAP”), for resolving these types of disputes where the interpretation 
and application of a treaty is involved. Article 25 of the Model Conven-
tion, implemented in existing bilateral treaties, provides that if the tax-
payer believes that the actions of one or both of the countries result in 
taxation “not in accordance with the convention,” he can present the case 
to the “competent authority” of the country of which he is a resident.47 If 
that country cannot resolve the problem unilaterally, it has the obligation 
under the treaty to undertake discussions with the other country to “en-
deavor” through the MAP to resolve the issue. This procedure usually 
results in a “mutual agreement” that provides a resolution to the issue 
regarding the treaty. If, after “endeavoring” to agree, the two countries 
are in fact unable to agree, however, the taxpayer is potentially left with 
unrelieved double taxation, thus thwarting the principal purpose of the 
treaty, to avoid double taxation.48 
The lack of a mechanism to achieve a solution to these issues under tax 
treaties has become more and more striking as nontax barriers to trade 
and investment are eliminated and tax issues assume greater and greater 
importance. Competing trade49 and investment disciplines50 already pro-
vide institutional structures to resolve disputes in their fields of compe-
tence, and the lack of such a mechanism in the tax area is highlighted. 
For many years, there have been proposals to have unresolved treaty 
issues dealt with by some form of arbitration procedure.51 A number of 
existing treaties contain a provision for optional arbitration, but as a 
practical matter, the provisions have not been used; as both competent 
authorities must agree to go forward, it is possible for one of the authori-
ties to block the arbitration when the taxpayer requests the proceeding. In 
order to ensure some kind of consistent and binding arbitration decision, 
it would be necessary to provide for the mandatory arbitration of unre-
solved cases after a certain period of time has passed. There have been 
                                                                                                             
 47. OECD, Model Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital art. 
25, para. 5, July 17, 2008, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/32/41147804.pdf 
[hereinafter Model Tax Convention]. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah, The WTO, Export Subsidies, and Tax Competition, 
in WTO AND DIRECT TAXATION 115 (Michael Lang, Judith Herdin & Ines Hofbauer eds., 
2005). 
 50. See, e,g., Thomas Walde & Abba Kolo, Investor-State Disputes: The Interface 
Between Treaty-Based International Investment Protection and Fiscal Sovereignty, 35 
INTERTAX 424 (2007). 
 51. See, e.g., GUSTAF LINDENCRONA & NILS MATTSSON, ARBITRATION IN TAXATION 
(1981). 
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several proposals modeled on commercial arbitration from private sector 
groups providing for mandatory arbitration in tax matters.52 These pro-
posals essentially deal with the arbitration of tax disputes as an alterna-
tive to the existing MAP procedures. 
Not unexpectedly, countries’ reactions to proposals for mandatory ar-
bitration in taxation have historically been muted. From a theoretical 
perspective, giving up the power to determine the tax liability of a tax-
payer to a nongovernmental body could be viewed as an unacceptable 
intrusion on the State’s sovereignty. From a practical point of view, the 
competent authorities charged with deciding the case could object to hav-
ing the case taken out of their hands. Nonetheless, the practical need for 
some kind of mechanism to resolve disputes grew increasingly clear. At 
the same time, there were complaints from the private sector about the 
functioning of the existing MAP procedure. The procedure took too long 
and was not transparent; it was costly and expenses were incurred with 
no assurance of an acceptable outcome. 
The recognition early on that effective dispute resolution mechanisms 
were essential to the functioning of the OECD led to an OECD project to 
develop them. As the Committee of Fiscal Affairs observed in describing 
the background of the work of the Joint Working Group charged with 
developing the dispute resolution proposals: 
[P]roviding an effective dispute resolution mechanism for tax disputes 
is closely connected to the basic OECD approach to its work. The 
OECD is a consensus organization and does not typically generate 
“hard law” but principles and guidelines. Working in this way, it is un-
avoidable that differences in interpretation and application will arise. It 
is thus an important responsibility of the Organization to make every 
effort to ensure that there is a well-functioning procedural mechanism 
to deal with these disputes when they do arise. This is true both with 
regard to relations between Member countries, but also, and in some 
ways more importantly, in relations between the OECD Member coun-
tries and Non-OECD Economies . . . .  
The starting point for the [Joint Working Group’s] work was a detailed 
examination of the existing MAP process. It is clear that the MAP 
process will continue to be the basic mechanism for the resolution of 
international tax disputes. The existing MAP process has provided and 
will continue to provide a generally effective and efficient method for 
dealing with these issues. . . . [However] it remains the case that the ex-
isting procedures do not ensure that in all cases a final resolution of in-
                                                                                                             
 52. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CTR. FOR TAX POL’Y & ADMIN., 
IMPROVING THE PROCESS FOR RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL TAX DISPUTES, app. at 40–54 
(July 27, 2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/6/33629447.pdf. 
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ternational tax disputes can be achieved. Thus the JWG has considered 
in some detail a range of Supplementary Dispute Resolution . . . tech-
niques which can help to ensure that international tax disputes come to 
a satisfactory conclusion.53 
The focus of the OECD dispute resolution work was thus on improving 
the MAP process generally and providing supplementary mechanisms to 
make the MAP work more effectively. In this way, the proposal for man-
datory arbitration could be considered together with other changes and 
improvements in MAP generally and not a (threatening) free-standing 
proposal. This approach was carried forward in the structure of the arbi-
tration proposal developed by a Joint Working Group and ultimately 
adopted as part of the 2008 amendments to the Model Convention.54 Ar-
bitration was not presented, as in previous proposals, as an alternative to 
MAP, but as a means of supplementing MAP. Rather than taking the en-
tire unresolved case away from the competent authorities, the proposed 
arbitration procedure referred unresolved issues to the arbitrators. When 
the arbitrators’ decisions on those issues were reached, the case was re-
turned to the competent authorities to establish an agreed solution to the 
entire case. This solution went far to assuage countries’ sovereignty con-
cerns and, at the same time, left the competent authorities with an impor-
tant role in the final resolution of the case. 
A remaining issue was the relation of the arbitration procedure to the 
taxpayer’s domestic law remedies. Under the original proposal, the tax-
payer was required to give up his rights to domestic legal remedies as a 
condition to entering into the arbitration process. When this structure was 
presented in the initial Discussion Draft,55 it was met by skepticism from 
the private sector. There was objection to waiving domestic rights in a 
situation where the process remained a government-to-government one, 
the taxpayer had no right to be directly represented, and there was no 
assurance that double taxation would in fact be relieved. There were also 
concerns that such waivers might not be legally enforceable in some 
countries. 
In response to these concerns, the procedure was subsequently mod-
ified to provide that submission to arbitration did not require waiver of 
domestic rights. The unresolved issue would be submitted to arbitration; 
the arbitral decision would then be incorporated into a mutual agreement, 
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. at 3. 
 54. Model Tax Convention, supra note 47. 
 55. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CTR. FOR TAX POL’Y & ADMIN., 
PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING MECHANISMS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF TAX TREATY DISPUTES 
9 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/20/36054823.pdf. 
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which would be presented to the taxpayer as an agreed solution giving a 
uniform interpretation or application of the treaty. If the taxpayers af-
fected by the case agreed, the case could be resolved; if not, as is the 
normal procedure in mutual agreement cases, any taxpayer affected by 
the case could reject the MAP and be left with domestic remedies.56 In 
this way, the arbitration functioned to supplement MAP and allowed the 
case to be resolved. This approach was in general satisfactory to gov-
ernments since it minimized the intrusion of nongovernmental actors in 
the dispute resolution process and was also responsive to private sector 
concerns by providing for the mandatory resolution of the dispute issues 
without unduly compromising the ultimate recourse to domestic reme-
dies. Thus, by moving from an approach that viewed arbitration as an 
alternative to traditional procedures, to dealing with arbitration as part of 
a general process of improving dispute resolution, a satisfactory resolu-
tion of the various concerns was achieved. 
Article 25.5 of the Model Convention now contains a procedure for 
mandatory arbitration following the structure outlined above, and a sam-
ple mutual agreement contained in the Commentary includes a substantial 
discussion as to the details of the procedure.57 It provides for a number of 
“default” provisions to deal with situations where one of the parties to 
the arbitration is stalling or refusing to cooperate. For example, if one of 
the competent authorities does not appoint an arbitrator within the stipu-
lated time frame, the Director of the Centre for Tax Policy and Adminis-
tration is authorized to make the appointment, thus allowing the process 
to go forward. It is not expected that many cases will in fact require arbi-
tration. Even under prior procedures, the vast majority of MAP cases 
were satisfactorily resolved, and the possibility of arbitration at the end 
of the two-year period provided should likely increase the competent 
authorities’ efforts to reach a successful conclusion to the case.58 
The new paragraph is accompanied by a footnote, which provides: 
In some States, national law, policy or administrative considerations 
may not allow or justify the type of dispute resolution envisaged under 
this paragraph. In addition, some States may only wish to include this 
paragraph in treaties with certain States. For these reasons, the para-
                                                                                                             
 56. In practice, it is very rare for an agreed MAP solution to be rejected because it can 
cause the taxpayer to face the possibility of conflicting national decisions and the result-
ing double taxation. 
 57. Model Tax Convention, supra note 47. 
 58. The prophylactic effect of the existence of an arbitration procedure should en-
courage the competent authorities to reach a decision to avoid having to refer the case to 
arbitration. As was observed in the process of the dispute resolution work, “The best 
arbitration is no arbitration.” 
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graph should only be included in the Convention where each State con-
cludes that it would be appropriate to do so . . . .59 
The inclusion of the footnote was important for some countries that 
were still hesitant about the arbitration procedure, and it allowed them to 
approve the procedure in principle while still retaining some flexibility in 
its application.60 It was clear in the nearly ten-year process leading to the 
adoption of the new article that it took countries some time to understand 
and become comfortable with arbitration. In that process, it was impor-
tant to move from a generalized discussion of whether countries were 
“for” or “against” arbitration to looking at the details of a concrete pro-
posal, which could then be modified in a nuanced way to take specific 
concerns into account. The use of the footnote technique was part of that 
evolution. 
It remains to be seen how the dispute resolution process will work in 
the future. Article 25.5 in the Model, even accompanied by the footnote, 
establishes the principle that an arbitration procedure is important in the 
proper functioning of the treaty, and the extensive Commentary offers 
solutions to many of the structural problems involved in making arbitra-
tion function. The United States has recently ratified three new treaties 
containing mandatory arbitration procedures: Protocol to the Germany-
United States treaty (signed June 1, 2006), the new Belgium-United 
States treaty (signed November 27, 2006), and the 5th Protocol to the 
Canada-United States treaty (signed September 21, 2007). In addition, 
other important recent treaties contain mandatory arbitration provisions 
along the lines of the OECD Model.61 Thus, it may take some time be-
fore arbitration is a standard provision in bilateral treaties. However, as 
an “international norm,” the provision in the Model will certainly speed 
up the process. 
                                                                                                             
 59. Model Tax Convention, supra note 47. 
 60. See id. at 7 n.1. The footnote technique was also used in connection with the 
adoption of Article 27 dealing with assistance in the collection of taxes, an issue that also 
raises some sensitive issues. 
 61. The recently signed Netherlands-U.K. treaty contains an arbitration provision that 
tracks very closely the provision in the OECD Model. Compare Convention for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to 
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C. Services Permanent Establishment 
One of the principal functions of tax treaties is to relieve double taxa-
tion by allocating taxing jurisdiction between the source and resident 
States. This is technically accomplished by reducing the source country’s 
taxing claims in some situations and requiring the residence country to 
give double tax relief for the source country tax in cases where the 
source country has retained the right under the treaty to tax the income. 
Under this set of rules, in order for the source country to have the right 
to tax business profits, the OECD Model requires a certain level of eco-
nomic penetration in the source country, a so-called “permanent estab-
lishment.” While the treaty definition of permanent establishment is 
complex, it generally requires some sort of “fixed place of business” 
through which the business of the enterprise is carried on.62 As a result of 
this definition, the provision in the source country of personal services 
not attributable to a permanent establishment generally does not give the 
source country the right to tax.63 The 2008 update of the OECD Model 
confirms the OECD’s basic policy conclusion that its provision of per-
sonal services should not constitute a permanent establishment. How-
ever, the Commentary to Article 5 now provides for an “alternative pro-
vision” whereby countries that do not share the policy conclusion could 
allow the taxation of profits from the provision of personal services if the 
period in which the personal services are performed in the source country 
exceeds 183 days over a twelve-month period, even in the absence of a 
fixed place of business.64 The public Discussion Draft that presented the 
Report of the Working Group that developed the proposal set forth the 
background of the proposal: 
The report of the Working Group concluded that no changes should be 
made to the provisions of the OECD Model Tax Convention and that 
services should continue to be treated the same way as other types of 
business activities. Under the applicable rules of the OECD Model, the 
profits from services performed in the territory of a Contracting State 
by an enterprise of the other Contracting State are not taxable in the 
first-mentioned State if they are not attributable to a permanent estab-
lishment situated therein (as long as they are not covered by other Ar-
ticles of the Convention that would allow such taxation). This result, 
                                                                                                             
 62. The OECD work on establishing an international consensus on how this principle 
would apply in the case of electronic commerce has been extensively discussed in the 
literature. See, e.g., Cockfield, supra note 4, at 144. 
 63. The U.N. Model contains a services permanent establishment provision. U.N. 
Model Double Taxation Convention Between Developed and Developing Countries art. 
5(3)(b), U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/102 (Jan. 1, 1980). 
 64. Model Tax Convention, supra note 47, at 102–03. 
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under which these profits are only taxable in the State of residence of 
the enterprise, is supported by various policy and administrative con-
siderations. . . . The report acknowledged, however, that some States 
are reluctant to adopt the above principle of exclusive residence taxa-
tion of services that are not attributable to a permanent establishment 
situated on their territory but that are performed on that territory and 
noted that these States propose alternative provisions to preserve source 
taxation rights, in certain circumstances, with respect to the profits 
from such services. 
The Working Group considered that it was important to circumscribe 
the circumstances in which States that did not agree with its conclusion 
could, in a bilateral treaty, provide that profits from services performed 
by a foreign enterprise could be taxed by them even if not attributable 
to a permanent establishment situated on their territory. In particular, 
the Group considered that it was important to stress that a State should 
not have source taxation rights on income derived from the provision of 
services performed by a non-resident outside that State, that only the 
profits from services, as opposed to the gross payments for these ser-
vices, should be subjected to tax and that it was appropriate, for com-
pliance and other reasons, not to allow a State to tax the profits from 
services performed on their territory in certain circumstances (e.g. 
when such services are provided during a very short period of time).65 
IV. WHAT IS THE “MODEL”? WHAT IS THE “NORM”? 
This brief exposition of a few recent activities of the OECD in the tax 
area is by no means exhaustive and is intended only to review several 
representative projects.66 It does allow, however, some modest conclu-
sions about the OECD’s role in the “formation of international norms.” 
It is clear that the OECD has become much more open and inclusive in 
its work. The accession project for new Members, the increased role of 
Observers in Committee activities, the proposal for enhanced engage-
ment, the extensive activities in the Multilateral Centres, and the activi-
ties of the Global Forum on Taxation have all brought different voices to 
the discussions of international tax issues. In addition, business represen-
tatives are consulted more frequently, as it is important that the tax pol-
icy makers understand the commercial settings in which the tax rules will 
                                                                                                             
 65. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CTR. FOR TAX POL’Y & ADMIN., THE TAX 
TREATY TREATMENT OF SERVICES: PROPOSED COMMENTARY CHANGES 2–3 (Dec. 8, 2006), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/2/20/37811491.pdf [hereinafter TAX TREATY 
TREATMENT OF SERVICES]. 
 66. For a description of the ongoing work at the Centre for Tax Policy and Analysis, 
see ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. CTR. FOR TAX POL’Y & ADMIN., CURRENT 
TAX AGENDA (2008), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/17/1909369.pdf. 
780 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
apply. All States have an interest in designing workable rules, and in-
cluding private sector representatives in the process (e.g., through the use 
of Discussion Drafts prior to final decisions) helps to focus on these is-
sues. 
This expansion of scope, however, has increased the difficulty of 
reaching consensus on some questions. The OECD has been most suc-
cessful where it works to establish principles of sufficient specificity to 
be helpful in channelling policy formulation, but not principles so de-
tailed as to be too restrictive of the ways in which the countries can im-
plement them. Thus, with respect to dispute resolution, the basic principle 
of the need for arbitration as a means to resolve treaty disputes has been 
established, but the details have been left open.67 In addition, the footnote 
concerning the possibility that some countries may not wish to use arbi-
tration in all cases also makes the Model less prescriptive, but at the 
same time, it keeps the basic principle as part of the Model. 
A similar situation exists in the case of reservations and observations 
to the Model.68 By allowing countries to indicate reservations with re-
spect to particular narrow issues, agreement can be reached on the basic 
structure and approach of the provision in question. The discussions and 
peer pressure to come to a consensus conclusion on as much of the treaty 
and commentary text as possible work to narrow the areas of disagree-
ment. Thus, the OECD work can provide the basic structure for technical 
rules on which all agree, leaving other issues for further, usually bilat-
eral, negotiation. In other cases, the use of alternative provisions in the 
Commentary to the Model can preserve the basic principle in the Model 
while allowing countries “reluctant” to accept the majority view to have 
their position expressed. At the same time, this allows a process in which 
variation from the Model can be “circumscribed” and made to work 
technically.69 
Not all view these developments as favorable. The BIAC comments 
from the business community indicated that it was very “concerned” 
                                                                                                             
 67. Note, for example, that details of the arbitration procedure are set forth in an An-
nex. 
 68. See Model Tax Convention, supra note 47, at 14–15. 
 69. For example, the changes in the commentary make it clear that if personal servic-
es are to be taxed in connection with a personal services permanent establishment, they 
must be taxed on a net basis, allowing a deduction for associated costs, and not on a gross 
basis, thus disapproving of the approach taken by some countries and establishing net-
basis taxation as the norm. Tax Treaty Treatment of Services, supra note 65, at 6. 
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about the use of alternative provisions.70 A former Chair of the Commit-
tee on Fiscal Affairs recently observed: 
In terms of the model tax convention, in my view, in many ways it no 
longer reflects consensus because of all of the reservations and obser-
vations the convention and the commentary now contain. More impor-
tantly, some of the diverging views are now presented in areas that go 
beyond reservations and observations. For example, the commentary to 
the latest update to the model includes an alternative position on the 
taxation of services in the article on permanent establishments (article 
5). How can consensus be maintained if the commentary provides al-
ternative positions? A similar situation arises in the article on assistance 
in the collection of taxes (article 27). The article contains a footnote 
saying that in some countries, national law, policy, or administrative 
considerations may not allow or justify the type of assistance envisaged 
under this article and therefore indicates that this article only applies 
where countries agree. In my view, if the country’s law does not allow 
for collection assistance as provided in this article, then the country 
should change its law. Because the model convention increasingly al-
lows countries to cherry-pick among their favorite provisions, the mod-
el really no longer is a model.71 
Thus, in taking its work forward, the challenge for the OECD will be 
to develop techniques that can not only establish agreement on policy 
principles and technical rules to the extent possible, but at the same time 
provide for adequate “escape valves” on certain issues to facilitate 
agreement on others. While the OECD is certainly not a “Ruler of the 
World,” by taking advantage of its expanded institutional structure and 
its high technical standards, going forward it seems to be well-placed to 
contribute to the development of international tax norms. 
 
                                                                                                             
 70. Letter from Patrick J. Ellingsworth, Chair, Bus. & Indus. Advisory Comm. on 
Taxation & Fiscal Affairs, to Jeffrey Owens, Dir., Ctr. For Tax Pol’y & Admin. (Feb. 20, 
2007), available at http://www.biac.org/statements/tax/Final-07-01-22-services-tax-treaty-
treatment.pdf. 
 71. Joann M. Weiner, Inteview with Joseph Guttentag, 51 TAX NOTES INT’L 1024 
(2008). Guttentag was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (International) in the 
Clinton Administration. 
